ABSTRACT As PUFs become ubiquitous for commercial products (e.g., FPGAs from Xilinx, Altera, and Microsemi), attacks against these primitives are evolving toward more omnipresent and even advanced techniques. Machine learning (ML) attacks, among other non-invasive attacks, are proven to be feasible and cost-effective in the real-world. However, for PUF designers, it still remains an open question whether their countermeasures, or even new designs, are resistant to these types of attacks. Although standard metrics for estimating PUF quality exist, the most common approaches for measuring resistance to ML attacks are empirical. This paper introduces PUFmeter, a new publicly available toolbox consisting of in-house developed algorithms, to provide a firm basis for the robustness assessment of PUFs against ML attacks. To this end, new metrics and notions are reintroduced by PUFmeter to PUF designers and manufacturers. Furthermore, to prepare the PUF input-output pairs adequately before conducting any analysis, PUFmeter involves modules that output the minimum number of measurement repetitions and the upper bound on the noise level affecting the PUF responses.
I. INTRODUCTION
A physically unclonable function (PUF) can be thought of as either a device fingerprint for secure authentication or as a source of entropy in secure key generation scenarios. The popularity of PUFs, especially for commercially available integrated circuits (ICs), stems from the premise of providing a higher level of security, compared to conventional approaches for generating and storing keys. Nevertheless, even after decades of research and development, growth in demand for secure PUFs has not lost momentum. This growth is promoted through efforts made to compromise the security of PUFs by launching, e.g., non-invasive attacks. Among these attacks, machine learning (ML) attacks have been well recognized due to their cost-effectiveness, and ease of launch. These characteristics make ML attacks particularly attractive for a wide variety of attackers, who solely need a small subset of inputs and outputs of PUFs to mount their attacks.
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Therefore, in recent efforts, special attention is paid to design PUFs that are resilient to ML attacks [1] , [2] . In various cases, to show how the resiliency of a newly designed PUF is strengthened, an empirical ML algorithm (e.g., support vector machine, SVM, algorithms) is chosen and applied to the PUF. This naturally raises a question of whether the PUF is resilient to other ML algorithms, and more importantly, whether the results can be generalized to other instances of the PUF family. In the absence of adequate responses to these questions, methodologies employed to assess the robustness of PUFs against ML attacks lack firm foundations and consistency between metrics used in various studies.
To address this, our paper introduces PUFmeter [3] , a toolbox that is useful to evaluate the security of real-world PUFs, under ML attacks, with no focus on specific types of PUFs (for more details on this, see Section II). In particular, PUFmeter consists of in-house developed, provable algorithms (see Section II for more details), which trace their roots back to well-established fields of research, namely property testing, ML theory, and Boolean analysis. PUFmeter further VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ introduces new metrics and notions, originated in the Boolean and Fourier analyses [4] , [5] , with the hope to fill the gap between ML theory and hardware security. We stress that introducing new metrics do not rule out the use of common metrics known in the PUF-related literature, for instance, robustness, unpredictability, etc. [6] . In fact, the new metrics can contribute to the development of a new benchmarking system, which can include not only the previous metrics, but also new metrics introduced by PUFmeter.
From the usability point of view, it is worth noting that the output of PUFmeter is a report on whether the PUF under test is subject to ML attacks and which metric is used to make this decision. Furthermore, our algorithms are written in Matlab, and no specific toolbox is required to use PUFmeter. Finally, we emphasize that we do not claim to develop the most efficient codes in PUFmeter, but instead, we provide examples of codes to assess some properties of a PUF. The following summarizes the above discussion and highlights the contribution of this paper.
1) This paper for the first time shows clearly the relationship between the notions and algorithms introduced before in [4] , [5] . More precisely, by illustrating the workflow of PUFmeter and discussing it in details, a step-by-step approach is introduced that reflects how to employ those notions and algorithms. 2) Additionally, this paper introduces the pre-processing modules involved in PUFmeter. In this context, PUFmeter incorporates a module that accounts for computing the minimum number of measurements needed to resolve the noisy CRPs by performing majority voting. This module is further useful for designing PUFs and assessing their quality in terms of reliability. Furthermore, another module in PUFmeter estimates the upper bound of the noise affecting the responses of a PUF, as required by the majority of ML algorithms that tolerates the noise. Both of the above modules can be used along with any ML algorithm for pre-processing. 3) For PUF designers and manufacturers, PUFmeter paves the way for the establishment of solid common criteria and a basis for the assessment of PUF security. In line with other ML attacks, PUFmeter aims at exploring new aspects of the question of why and to what extent a PUF can be modeled by ML methods. However, due to the provably-correct nature of the algorithm incorporated in PUFmeter, it ensures the reproducibility as well as generalization to other instances of the PUF family. The former means that for a given set of CRPs, the model built by the algorithms is reproducible, whereas the latter implies that the model built upon a PUF uniformly chosen from a PUF family can be generalized to other PUFs in that family. This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we elaborate on the characteristics of a PUF, interesting for PUFmeter. Moreover, we specify how PUFmeter helps to prepare data for the next steps of our analyses, namely Boolean analyses, described in Section III. We provide an example of how PUFmeters can be used (Section IV), and finally, conclude the paper by discussing the applicability of that in Section V.
II. PUFS AS SEEN BY PUFMETER
We neither discuss the notion of PUFs from the point of view of hardware security nor provide a formalization of these primitive (see, e.g., [6] , [7] for more details on these), but stick to what PUFmeter needs to know about a PUF. That is, a PUF is a mapping from a set of the challenges (i.e., inputs of the PUF) C to a set of responses Y that are the outputs of the PUF. More formally, we have f PUF : C → Y , with f PUF (c) = y. Here, f PUF denotes a function representing the challenge-response behavior of the PUF. Additionally, → denotes the mapping between two sets, determined in our case by the inherent physical characteristics of the device embodying the PUF. For PUFmeter, we define an n-bit PUF as f : F n 2 → F 2 . As the above definition implies, similar to other ML algorithms, PUFmeter requires to observe the challenges and their respective responses to study the challenge-response behavior of the PUF. In other words, if the challenges and/ or the responses are further enhanced by any means so that such a challenge-response behavior cannot be observed by the attacker, PUFmeter may not be useful in such cases. For instance, PUFs with a single challenge are out of scope of PUFmeter. Nevertheless, even for such PUFs, by using PUFmeter the designer can still evaluate the security of the PUF as it is available to the designer. Moreover, regarding the size of the set of CRPs, PUFs are categorized as weak or strong: in contrast to weak PUFs, strong PUFs have an exponentially large set of CRPs [8] . Clearly, for weak PUFs, it might be unnecessary to discuss the robustness of them to ML attacks, even though PUFmeter can be employed to study some properties related to the quality of a weak PUF (see Section III). However, we emphasize that PUFmeter primarily aims to assess the robustness of PUFs to ML attacks. Hence, other types of attacks including physical attacks (see, as an example, [9] ) and mathematical, cryptanalytic attacks, e.g., [10] , hybrid attacks [11] , [12] , and attacks against PUF-based protocols (e.g., [13] ) are beyond the scope of our paper.
In order to examine the properties of a PUF, one can begin with giving a subset of challenge-response pairs (c i , f PUF (c i )) (1 ≤ i ≤ M ) to an algorithm that can be empirical (e.g., [14] , [15] ) or provable, as we have in PUFmeter. When employing an empirical ML algorithm fed by M CRPs, it is not known if the algorithm would deliver any model, i.e., the confidence level (δ) is not known, see, e.g., [16] , where the convergence conditions of the attack proposed in [17] is discussed. More crucially, if a model is delivered, its accuracy (ε) is not ensured. It can be thought that if we repeat such an experiment in several rounds by giving the algorithm M j CRPs (i.e., in the j th round, with 1 ≤ j ≤ t), the accuracy can be improved, see Figure 1 . Even in this case, the accuracy and confidence levels are not guaranteed. In this regard, an interesting approach has been proposed in [18] , where tree classifiers along with ensemble, meta-algorithms, namely FIGURE 1. (a) An empirical ML algorithm, and (b) a provable ML algorithm, both applied against an n-bit PUF. h denotes the model delivered by the machine. ε * is the desired accuracy of h, and the acceptable confidence level δ * is the probability of obtaining the desired model. For empirical ML algorithms, in contrast to provable algorithms, it is not known whether after each learning phase, e.g., the j th (1 ≤ j ≤ t ) round, the accuracy of the achieved model, ε j , equals (at least) ε * . Contrary to provable ML algorithms, it is neither assured that the algorithm converges to desired, accurate model (i.e., the confidence level is not known) nor the number of CRPs required for learning (M) is known a priori.
bagging and boosting techniques, have been used to enhance the effectiveness of an ML attack. When comparing such advanced techniques with other empirical ML algorithms, one should consider that ensemble, meta-algorithms can outperform since (1) for the bagging technique, the training dataset can be enhanced through bootstrapping, and (2) several weak classifier are combined for the boosting approach. Nevertheless, for weak classifiers, the accuracy and confidence levels cannot be set prior to conducting the experiment. This is in contrast to provable algorithms, for which not only these levels, but also the maximum number of CRPs required by the algorithm can be set beforehand.
We stress that PUFmeter is a toolbox, which is composed of not only ML algorithms to compromise the security of PUF (i.e., the LMN algorithm, see Section III), but also modules useful to evaluate properties of PUFs and pre-process the CRP data set for this purpose. In this section, we describe two modules integrated into PUFmeter to prepare the CRPs for performing analyses. Note that these modules can be employed by any ML algorithm and their application is not limited to PUFmeter.
A. LOWER BOUND ON THE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENT REPETITIONS
In contrast to deterministic functions, the response of a PUF to a given challenge applied to that repetitively is not consistent [19] . This phenomenon is described by the term ''noisy behavior'' of the PUF. Here we do not elaborate on the origins of the noise and how to model that in PUF-related scenarios, for more details on these see [5] , [19] . Nevertheless, not only attackers, but also PUF designers have to deal with noisy CRPs. The current practice is to apply the majority voting technique, if it is aimed to resolve the noisy cases [20] . This means that each challenge is fed into the PUF repetitively and the majority over them is computed. As for testing/ ML algorithms the majority voting can be a crucial pre-processing technique, the algorithm explained here is beneficial to know how many repetitions are needed to obtain reliable responses.
Regardless of how the majority voting is performed -by applying a module in PUFmeter or before giving the CRPs to PUFmeter-the number of repetitions of the measurements must have been defined at the first stage. In practice, a good rule of thumb could be a number lies within an interval of about 10 to 30, cf. [4] , [20] . Nonetheless, the minimum number of repetitions (R) needed to reach a desired level of reliability can be computed before conducting the measurements.
In PUFmeter package, an algorithm is devoted to coping with this issue by following an approach that has a close connection to the model proposed in [19] . However, the critical difference is that the accurate model proposed in [19] aims to describe the impact of the noise on PUF responses, whereas here we attempt to come up with a lower bound on the number of measurement repetitions. To this end, we rely on the fact that after doing majority voting, the reliability of the PUF responses should be increased to a desired value, e.g., 95%. This value can be easily translated to the error that the majority voting algorithm is allowed to make, e MV (i.e., 5% in our previous example). To relate this error to the error rate of individual response measurement, e i , we adopt a heterogeneous model, where the error rate of each measurement can be different from others. Similar approaches have been discussed in the literature so far [19] , [21] . Therefore, the distribution of the error that can be made by the majority voting algorithm is
where k = R/2 , µ n and ν n are the normalized mean and variance, respectively. These values depend on the number of measurement R as follows, cf. [22] .
With regard to this model, our algorithm can be used to approximate the lower bound R as a function of e MV , given to that as an input.
B. UPPER BOUND ON THE NOISE LEVEL
Another interesting observation made in the literature is that the performance of ML algorithms is particularly sensitive to the noise (see [23] - [25] as some examples), except ones specifically designed to deal with noisy examples. Note that this is not in contrast to what has been observed in [17] , [26] . The modeling algorithms applied by Delvaux and Verbauwhede [26] and Becker [17] leverage the information leaked by the noisy responses of a PUF. Therefore, their algorithms can be categorized as a hybrid, side channel-ML type, which is entirely different from conventional ML algorithms, including the algorithms involved in PUFmeter.
More importantly, if an algorithm can be used in the presence of noise, the upper bound on the noise level is usually assumed to be known. In order to relax this assumption, algorithms have been developed to approximate this noise level [27] . An essential characteristic of these algorithms is related to the number of measurements R (see Section II-A) that an algorithm can observe. Although there are different approaches to apply, PUFmeter employs an algorithm with R = 1 [27] . The idea behind this algorithm is to count the number of examples that are not consistent with a given rule (i.e., a learning hypothesis). To this end, N hypothetical rules should be first defined by applying an algorithm compatible with a provable ML framework, i.e., the probably approximately correct (PAC) learning, cf. [27] . Afterward, the algorithm begins by guessing the upper bound on the noise level η, as η < 1/4.
Step-by-step, this value is updated according to the number of examples, being inconsistent with the N hypothetical rules. It has been proven that this algorithm halts after a polynomial number of iteration depending on log 2 (1 − 2η) [27] . Furthermore, to compute the upper bound on the noise, the total number of examples (i.e., CRPs in our scenario) is O (1 − 2η) −2 ln(N /(1 − 2η)δ) . Note that this sample complexity should not be confused with the sample complexity of a learning algorithm.
The essence of this method is that we impose no limit on the algorithm applied to build these N hypothetical rules. In our implementation, we apply the nonlinear regression, whose applicability for this purpose is due to the ability of this algorithm to remove the outliers [28] . One natural question is whether a regression algorithm can be integrated into the PAC learning framework. This has been already addressed by applying a discretization process as suggested in [29] .
III. BOOLEAN ANALYSIS EMPLOYED BY PUFMETER AND VULNERABILITY TO ML
As discussed in Section I, PUFmeter introduces algorithms as well as metrics, being first studied in ML theory, and in particular, Boolean analysis. This does not contradict application of metrics defined to assess the quality of PUFs, namely cost, reliability, and security [30] . The former metric relates to how efficient a PUF can be implemented, mainly explained by the silicon footprint. The reliability of a PUF is described by its insensitivity to environmental and temporal variations, falling under the notion of intra-distance [31] , [32] . While it is more straightforward to quantify the quality of PUFs in terms of cost and reliability, the security of PUFs against different attacks, in particular ML attacks, should be considered more carefully. As an attempt to formalize the impact of such attacks on a PUF, the entropy -also estimated by the uniqueness, or measured by inter-distance -has been used as a metric [33] . In addition to the entropy, the bias in the PUF responses can be beneficial to launch mathematical, in particular, machine learning attacks. In a nutshell, in contrast to standard metrics for estimating PUF quality, defining an appropriate measure indicating the resistance to attacks is still under discussion.
Indeed, the metrics introduced by PUFmeter can be considered as a new interpretation of the commonly used metrics, helpful when we evaluate the security of PUFs in the face of ML attacks. For instance, the notion of average sensitivity and noise sensitivity applied by PUFmeter are closely related to the min-entropy and the strict avalanche criterion (SAC), respectively. Table 1 presents the metrics and techniques used by PUFmeter, and how they should be interpreted. Besides, it sums up the relationships between the metrics and learnability as well as metrics previously used in PUF-related literature. Moreover, this table shows the theoretical bounds established on the new metric introduced by PUFmeter. It is worth noting here that although these bounds are asymptotically (in n) meaningful, they can help the PUF designers to assess to what extent their PUFs are vulnerable to provable ML attacks. More precisely, if the metrics exceed the bounds, as shown in the table, the PUF may not be vulnerable to provable ML algorithms discussed in the paper. This section covers the definition of the variables in these bounds and relationship between the metrics and algorithms mentioned in the first column of Table 1 .
In brief, we begin with how PUFmeter computes the average influence of the challenge bits on the responses (i.e., the average sensitivity). As mentioned in Table 1 , the average sensitivity of a PUF is closely related to the minentropy of that, and therefore, it can be also beneficial to evaluate the quality of (even, weak) PUFs. It is known that a Boolean function -a PUF in our case -with low average sensitivity can be close to a ''k-junta'' function: the responses are determined by an unknown set of k (k < n) variables. In this case, a k-junta learning algorithm can be applied to predict the responses of the PUF to an unseen challenge. In the above formulation, the ''low'' average sensitivity means that it is polynomial in ln(n).
Nevertheless, there exist functions being close to the class of k-junta functions, which have a considerably high average sensitivity [34] , [35] . Hence, it is suggested to compute the noise sensitivity, and if the result is sufficiently low, we can conclude that our function (i.e., our PUF) can be modeled by applying a k-junta learning algorithm. In addition to the average sensitivity and the noise sensitivity, by running a k-junta testing algorithm, PUFmeter further examines if a PUF is close to a k-junta function. Finally, if this holds, by running a provable ML algorithm, PUFmeter learns the challenge-response behavior of the PUF under test.
The Average Sensitivity: PUFmeter computes the average sensitivity as follows. We begin with the definition of the influence of variable i on f : F n 2 → F 2 that is
where c ⊕i is obtained by flipping the i th bit of c. Note that similar approaches have been proposed in the literature to conduct fault diagnosis on PUFs [36] ; however, here we are interested in the challenge pairs that result in obtaining different PUF responses. Now the average sensitivity of a Boolean function f can be defined as
As a direct computation of Inf i (f ) and I (f ) is not efficient in practice, PUFmeter approximates the average sensitivity [37] . First, for a given number of stages in a PUF, PUFmeter generates a set of uniformly chosen challenges and its corresponding set with the same challenges, whose i th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) bit is flipped, i.e., a set of c and a set of c ⊕i . These sets are given to the user to be fed into the PUF and given back to PUFmeters along with the respective responses. As defined above, the influence of the i th variable on a Boolean function, Inf i (f ) can be computed, if we collect a large enough number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs). When we repeat this for all the challenge bits, it is possible to approximate the average sensitivity I (f ). It has been proven that the number of CRPs required by this algorithm is O (p(1/ε)n/I (f )), p(·) is a polynomial function [37] .
The Noise Sensitivity: We stress that the notion of noise sensitivity should not be confused by the noise discussed in the PUF-related literature.
Consider the encoding scheme χ(0 F 2 ) := +1, and χ(1 F 2 ) := −1, which is required since we define the noise sensitivity of the Boolean function over the domain and range {−1, +1}. Now, let c be a uniformly chosen challenge and form the string c by flipping each bit of the string c independently, with probability ε (0 ≤ ε ≤ 1). Then, the noise sensitivity of f at ε can be defined as
It has been proven that the bound NS ε (f ) = ε 1/2+ (1) can be set to decide if a function is close to a k-junta [34] .
k-junta Testing: k-junta testing algorithms are one of the well-studied types of property testing algorithms developed in ML theory. In general, while an ML algorithm learns a class of target functions, a property tester examines whether properties of a specific class can be found in a given function [38] . In the context of PUFs, by running property testers, it is possible to further examine if a PUF can be approximated by a Boolean function from a specific class. More specifically, among various property testing algorithms proposed in the literature, PUFmeter adopts an algorithm used to figure out whether the functions f PUF can be well-approximated by junta functions. This class of functions is chosen since junta functions have a close relationship to various classes of functions (e.g., decision trees, decision lists, halfspaces, etc.). Besides, k-junta testers can serve as the first step in feature selection methods. More interestingly, the algorithm implemented in PUFmeter is compatible with PAC learning framework [39] .
The low degree algorithm: The core idea of the low degree algorithms (so-called, LMN algorithm) is that the Fourier transform can adequately represent a Boolean function. The seminal work of Linial et al. [40] was the first to make a connection between the Fourier spectrum and learnability. Their main result states that for some Boolean functions (e.g., k-junta functions), the low coefficients are sufficient to approximate these functions. Here, the term ''low coefficients'' refers to coefficients that correspond to small sub-sets of Boolean variables, located in the lower part of the Fourier spectrum. It has been proven that polynomial algorithms (i.e., the low degree algorithm) can learn Boolean functions approximated by such low coefficients. To this end, pre-defined levels the accuracy and confidence (i.e., δ and ) along with a polynomial number of input-output pairs of f , chosen uniformly at random, should be given to the algorithm to determine the low Fourier coefficients. Compared to other provable ML algorithms, the low degree algorithm is superior in the sense that (1) it can tolerate the noise in the examples given to that, and (2) it is an improper learning algorithm, i.e., there is no limit on the hypotheses considered by the algorithm. The latter implies that infeasibility of applying this algorithm results in stronger security assurance.
In the context of PUFs, the low degree algorithm has been mounted against PUFs, which attempt to approximate f PUF by determining the most dominant Fourier coefficients of this function. This algorithm is included in the PUFmeter, whose output is the low coefficients approximating f PUF . Finally, regarding attacks that can take advantage of the information on the reliability of a PUF, we underline that the LMN algorithm can be thought of as this type of attacks. In particular, the notion of the noise sensitivity is closely related to the reliability of PUFs. Figure 2a illustrates the step taken by PUFmeter. As can be seen, the algorithm begins with reading the inputs related to a PUF under test, namely the number of bits in PUF challenges, n, and the accuracy as well as the confidence level. The minimum number of CRPs required by the algorithms included in PUFmeter is, of course, polynomial in the number of bits in a PUF challenge, and the levels of accuracy and confidence. This number is first computed by PUFmeter, and then the same number of challenges is chosen uniformly and generated by PUFmeter. Afterward, PUFmeter asks the user to provide the responses to the challenges. If the number of CRPs request by PUFmeter seems high to the user, the user can further tune the levels of accuracy and confidence. Note that if PUFmeter must do the majority voting, a different number of repetitions is required for each CRP, as explained in Section II-A. Upon receiving the responses, PUFmeter asks if the upper bound of the noise should be computed (see Figure 2b) . Afterward, it computes the average sensitivity. In order to compute the noise sensitivity in the next step, another set of well-structured CRPs is required marked by a star (*) in Figure 2a (see Section III). After computing the noise sensitivity, regarding this parameter, PUFmeter takes action and tests if a k-junta function can model the PUF. And if this is the case, in the end, it generates the low coefficients.
IV. EXAMPLES OF USING PUFMETER
Here we provide two examples of using PUFmeter, and more importantly, how to interpret the results. As the purpose of this paper is to introduce PUFmeter as a toolbox offering provable techniques, we stick to two representative examples: (1) a PUF, whose security can be also compromised by empirical ML algorithms, and (2) a PUF, whose robustness to ML attacks cannot be appropriately assessed by empirical ML algorithms. In the first case, PUFmeter offers more information on why such a PUF is vulnerable to ML attacks, while in the second case, empirical methods fail to achieve the same level of accuracy compared to our methods. Furthermore, in the latter case, when running an empirical algorithm, it is not ensured to obtain a model with a desired level of accuracy, as discussed in Section II. Nevertheless, more examples of using algorithms integrated into PUFmeter can be found in [3] . We have decided not to include all of such examples to keep this paper concise.
In our experiments, we set ε = 0.05 and δ = 0.01. Note that these values are only examples of what can be acceptable in practice. Nevertheless, the accuracy and confidence level can be as small as desired. In this regard, a decrease in the value of ε means that the algorithms deliver more accurate results, whereas a lower level of confidence δ shows that the probability of delivering the desired results is higher. It should be considered that such decreases in the accuracy and confidence levels result in an increase in the number of CRPs that should be collected from the PUF. This increase is polynomial in ε and δ. When reporting results achieved by using PUFMeter, these parameters should be provided for reasonable interpretation of the results.
As the first example, we use PUFmeter against ring oscillator (RO-) PUFs, whose dataset has been first introduced in [41] . Note that we consider the legacy RO-PUF as proposed in [42] , and therefore, the results achieved for this type of PUFs cannot be generalized to other version of RO-PUFs introduced in the literature, see, e.g., [43] . For an RO-PUF with 256 ROs, chosen uniformly at random from this set, the average sensitivity reported by PUFmeter is I (f PUF ) = 1.0679. Although the average sensitivity of our PUF is relatively small, as discussed before, we should compute the noise sensitivity as well. For our PUF, the noise sensitivity computed by PUFmeter is 0.0334. Furthermore, PUFmeter determines that there is one determinant variable, i.e., k = 1, and the low coefficients are 0.1001 and 0.0334, which are required to approximate the Fourier spectrum of our PUF. Note that to interpret the above results and relate them to the learnability of the PUF, PUFmeter uses the bounds presented in Table 1 . After performing the above analyses, PUFmeter reports that this PUF can be modeled by applying a k-junta learning functions and Fourier-based attacks.
As mentioned in Section II, for weak PUFs such as RO-PUFs, it may not be interesting to assess the resilience of them to ML attacks; however, their quality can be evaluated by employing PUFmeter. In an attempt to assess the properties of another weak PUF that is well accepted in our community, we take an SRAM PUF into consideration. Following instructions given in [44] , the SRAM PUF has been implemented on a microcontroller, namely, ATxmega16A4 [45] . For our experiments, we consider a block of the SRAM composed of 16 rows and 256 columns. The PUF is challenged by giving the memory addresses as explained in [46] and the noise in the responses are dealt with by applying majority voting on 7 measurements. This number of measurements, i.e., R = 7, is achieved by applying the pre-processing module described in Section II-A. Next, we compute the average sensitivity and the noise sensitivity of our PUF that equal 1.0597 and 0.2442, respectively. It is interesting to observe that the noise sensitivity of the PUF exceeds the bound reported in Table 1 , which means that the PUF may not be vulnerable to k-junta learning and attacks applying the low degree algorithm. To further confirm that, we run the k-junta test included in PUFmeter, whose report indicates that our PUF is not vulnerable to k-junta learning. This is in accordance with the principle that a strong correlation between challenge bits (i.e., logical SRAM addresses) should not exist for our PUF.
The above examples may not completely reflect the advantages of employing PUFmeter. As an example of scenarios, where empirical methods fail in contrast to our methods, modeling 64-bits BR-PUFs can be considered. In this case, the accuracy of the model generated by the SVM cannot be enhanced to a arbitrarily high level [47] , i.e., ε ≤ 0.95. Additionally, it is not guaranteed that the SVM converges to a model exhibiting even a limited accuracy. Both of these issues are addressed by the algorithms offered in PUFmeter [4] , [5] . In this regard, when running PUFmeter algorithms against 64-bits BR-PUFs, the accuracy is 99.53%.
Finally, we stress that the algorithms provided in this toolbox are technology-independent. This means that the workflow of PUFmeter is the same for PUFs embedded in ICs manufactured with different technology. Moreover, the examples given in the paper do not discuss the technology of the ICs embodying the PUF, but rather show how PUFmeter should be used in practice.
V. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS
This paper introduces PUFmeter that can help PUF designers, manufacturers, and researchers to examine if a PUF is vulnerable to ML attacks. Here we highlight points, mainly related to the questions that can come to mind, when using PUFmeter.
How can the contributions of this paper be compared to ones form the previous, most relevant work in the literature, i.e., [4] , [5] ? We can highlight the main differences between this paper and previous work as follows.
• This paper presents a step-by-step procedure and a clear roadmap of how to assess the robustness of a PUF against ML attacks previously discussed in the literature [4] , [48] .
• As discussed in Section I and II, the pre-processing modules embedded in PUFmeter account for crucial steps within a holistic framework, which have been missing in PUF-related literature, even in the most relevant work [4] , [5] , [48] .
• The property testing algorithm included in the PUFmeter package is different from one applied in [4] , [48] . The difference is that the letter can solely deliver the number of influential bits in the PUF challenges, whereas by employing PUFmeter, the designer can determine, which bits are influential. Hence, the results provided in Section IV and previous results provided in [4] , [48] are not comparable one-to-one.
• Finally, the bounds and their implications discussed in Table 1 have been partially addressed in the literature so far. Here, for the first time, the close connection between them and the learnability of a PUF is described in details.
Can we generalize the results of a property testing to other PUFs from the same family? First, we assume that from a PUF family implemented on some physical platforms, a random instance of a PUF is chosen that can be represented by the function f PUF (·), as defined in Section III. Moreover, PUFmeter assumes that the given set of CRPs are chosen randomly, although it makes no assumption about the distribution that those CRPs follow. However, for this hidden distribution, the distance between k-junta functions and the function f PUF is determined. If the above assumptions hold, PUFmeter can determine if the functions from the class F PUF = {F PUF n } can be close to the functions from a known class of k-junta functions.
Can we generalize the results achieved for a family of PUFs to other families? The answer is evidently negative. VOLUME 7, 2019 For each family of PUFs, the experiment should be repeated so that the assumptions mentioned above hold.
Why is it necessary to compute the noise sensitivity along with the average sensitivity? Although exhibiting low average sensitivity is sufficient to conclude that a PUF can be close to a k-junta function, it is not necessary while some functions are close to junta functions, but have considerably large average sensitivity [34] . Therefore, according to the proof presented by Bourgain, we should compute the noise sensitivity, and if it is sufficiently low, then the function f should be close to a junta [34] , [35] .
Is it possible to apply PUFmeter on the CRPs collected from a PUF equipped with fuzzy extractors? Regarding the applicability of PUFmeter on PUFs equipped with add-ons (e.g., fuzzy extractors, secure sketches, etc.), note that assessing the security of stand-alone PUFs is the main objective of PUFmeter, similar to other ML frameworks. Nevertheless, if a PUF is paired with a secure sketch, it is still possible to study its characteristics, see [49] for more details on secure sketches. When it comes to hashing the responses of a PUF, as the characteristics of the challenge-response model of the PUF is changed, ML approaches cannot be further helpful. Note that in this case, the security of the PUF-based scheme is enhanced by using the additional hash function. Do ML attacks introduced by PUFmeter require that the PUF interface is exposed and freely available to an attacker? To address this, we put emphasis on two points. First, the attacks introduced by PUFmeter, namely the k-junta learning and the LMN algorithm, do not require free access to the PUF interface. Secondly, PUFmeter is designed to help a PUF designer to assess the resilience of a PUF to provable ML attacks. For the PUF designer, the access to the CRPs required by the modules computing the average sensitivity and the noise sensitivity is available. Obviously, this is not contrary to the fact that our attacks do not need such access.
Is the application PUFmeter restricted to k-junta learning/ testing algorithm? Note that the attacks introduced by PUFmeter is not limited to k-junta learning. In addition to the LMN attack also offered by PUFmeter, the notion of the average sensitivity and the noise sensitivity can be employed to assess the security of PUFs against other ML attacks, e.g., learning decision trees, decision lists, etc.
To put it another way, the metrics introduced in this paper can be used to decide which ML algorithm can model a PUF. For instance, for a PUF, if k (the parameter in k-junta testing) does not exceed the bounds presented in Table 1 , k-junta learning attacks can be successfully launched against that PUF. Now, knowing that the responses of a PUF are determined only by a small subset of the challenge bits (i.e., PUFmeter reports that the PUF can be modeled by k-junta), other available algorithms for learning decision trees and decision lists can be applied to learn the PUF.
